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STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Did Officers possess specific articulable facts that Appellant
was involved in criminal activity to justify the detention of
Mr. Sery and his bag?
Did officers have probable cause to arrest the appellant?
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Respondent,

:

v.

:

MARK JOSEPH SERYf

:

Case No. 860333-CA

:

Category No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction of the
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, for unlawful
possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, in
violation of Title 58, Chapter 37, Section 8(2) (a)(i), Utah Code
Ann., (Supp. 1985) (Addendum A).

The appellant was found guilty

after having pled no contest while reserving his right to appeal the
denial of his motion to suppress.

The Court sentenced him to a term

of zero to five years at the Utah State Prison.

The Court stayed

imposition of such prison sentence and placed Appellant on
probation.

Judge Uno subsequently stayed the entire sentence after

issuing a Certificate of Probable Cause pending the outcome of this
appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On May 22, 1986, William Pearson, a sergeant with the Metro
Dade Police Department, was at the Salt Lake City Airport conducting
a training seminar in airport drug detection techniques for twenty
to twenty-five local law enforcement personnel (T. 5, 50). The

purpose of this seminar was to instruct local officers as to how to
carry out detection and apprehension of persons suspected of
transporting drugs, and to evaluate the need for a drug courier
detection unit at the Salt Lake Airport (T. 5). Sergeant Pearson
testified that his usual error rate using his drug detection
techniques was about ten percent, but while conducting his training
seminar, the error rate was fifty percent (T. 41, 53).
At approximately 11:05 a.m., Sergeant Pearson, Mark
Whitaker, an agent with the Utah State Bureau of Liquor and
Narcotics and two to four other officers were monitoring passengers
getting off a Delta Airlines Flight from Florida (T. 24, 42, 50).
According to Sergeant Pearson, the officers monitored that
particular flight because Florida is a source of marijuana and
cocaine (T. 23).
Sergeant Pearson observed Mr. Sery get off the plane
carrying a blue vinyl suit case (T. 6). Mr. Sery started looking
around for his ride immediately after getting off the plane (T.
67).

At that point Sergeant Pearson said, "let's follow him" (T.

25).

Sergeant Pearson did not compare Sery's appearance and

behavior to a drug courier profile and did not rely on such a
profile in deciding to follow him (T. 25). The officers followed
Mr. Sery, ten to fifteen feet behind him, up the concourse until Mr.
Sery reached a coffee shop (T. 6, 51). Before entering the coffee
shop, Mr. Sery stopped and looked around.

He spent several -minutes

in the coffee shop then emerged with a cold drink in his hands (T.
6).
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After leaving the coffee shop, Mr. Sery walked to a group
of phones which were directly in front of him.

He seated himself in

a partitioned area and stayed there three to five minutes. During
that time, he had a receiver at his ear and looked over the
partition in the direction of the officers, who were standing five
feet away, two times (T. 7, 45). At least three, and more possibly
six officers followed Mr. Sery and watched him as he sat in the
phone booth (T. 45, 50, 51).
As Mr. Sery left the phone area, Sergeant Pearson, Agent
Whitaker and at least one other officer approached him and requested
to speak with him (T. 8). Mr. Sery consented and, upon the request
of Sergeant Pearson, produced an airline ticket bearing the name of
Sid Sellow (T. 8). When asked for other pieces of identification
Mr. Sery told Sergeant Pearson that he had none and explained that
the airlines had not heard his name correctly and had written an
incorrect name on the ticket (T. 9). Sergeant Pearson did not ask
Mr. Sery what his correct name was and did not know his true name
until after he was arrested (T. 25). Sergeant Pearson asked Mr.
Sery what his destination was and Sery responded that he was going
to Evanston, Wyoming.

At this time, Sergeant Pearson asked for

permission to search Mr. Sery's suitcase.

Mr. Sery refused to

consent to a search of his suitcase, and Sergeant Pearson informed
Sery that he was free to leave (T. 9).
After releasing Mr. Sery, Officers continued to follow him
while Sergeant Pearson checked the phone number which Sery gave to
Delta Airlines when he made his reservations and found that the
number had been changed to an unpublished number (T. 10). Sergeant
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Pearson had no information as to when the ticket had been purchased
or how long ago Mr. Sery had given the unpublished number to the
airlines (T. 26).
At approximately noon, a drug detection dog arrived with
Officer Brook Plotnik from West Valley City (T. 15). Sergeant
Pearson, Agent Whitaker and another agent approached Mr. Sery, who
at this time was sitting outside the airport (T. 16) and asked him
if he would submit his suitcase for a sniff by a drug detection dog
(T. 17). Mr. Sery declined.

Sergeant Pearson then advised him that

he and his suitcase were being detained, that his bag would be
presented to the dog, and that it was necessary to go back inside
the building (T. 17). Mr. Sery got up, picked up his bag and
accompanied Sergeant Pearson inside.

Sergeant Pearson then took

Sery's suitcase from him, carried it behind the Delta baggage
counter and placed it in a lineup comprised of four other bags (T.
18).

The lineup was presented to the drug dog who had a positive

reaction to Mr. Sery's bag (T. 19). Agent Whitaker then took the
bag, advised Mr. Sery he was under arrest, advised him of his
rights, and made a cursory search of him (T. 49).
A search warrant was issued based on Sergeant Pearson's
affidavit (T. 49). The officers subsequently searched Mr. Sery's
bag and found cocaine (T. 50).
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, defense counsel
argued that the detention of Mr. Sery and his luggage was illegal
because the officers had neither an articulable suspicion that he
was engaged in drug activity nor probable cause to justify the
detention, and therefore evidence obtained as a result of the
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detention should be suppressed (T. 77). Judge Uno denied
defendant's motion to suppress (T. 79).
On July 9, 1986, Mr. Sery entered a conditional plea of no
contest, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to
suppress, to one count of unlawful possession of a controlled
substance, a third degree felony.

The Court sentenced him to a term

of zero to five years at the Utah State Prison.

The Court stayed

such prison sentence on the condition Mr. Sery successfully complete
a term of probation and pay a fine of two thousand dollars. Judge
Uno subsequently issued a Certificate of Probable Cause and stayed
the entire sentence pending the outcome of this appeal.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The officers lacked a reasonable suspicion based on
specific, objective facts to justify the detention of Appellant and
his suitcase.

Because the officers did not have a reasonable

suspicion to justify the detention, all evidence seized must be
suppressed.
The detention of Appellant exceeded the permissible scope
of a Terry investigative stop.

Because the officers lacked probable

cause to detain Appellant, all evidence seized from Appellant must
be suppressed.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.

THE DETENTION OF APPELLANT AND HIS LUGGAGE
FOR THE PURPOSE OF INVESTIGATION CONSTITUTED
AN UNLAWFUL SEIZURE SINCE THE OFFICERS LACKED
A REASONABLE SUSPICION THAT HE WAS INVOLVED
IN CRIMINAL ACTIVITY.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
protects individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures. In
-5 -

Terry v, Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, (1968), the United States Supreme Court
established a limited exception to the general requirement that
officers obtain a warrant, based on probable cause, for all seizures
of persons.

The Court recognized that a police officer may in

appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a
person for purposes of investigating the possibility of criminal
activity even though probable cause to make an arrest does not
exist.

Id. at 22. However, a brief detention, without probable

cause to arrest, which results in any curtailment of that person's
liberty by the police must be supported by a reasonable and
articulable suspicion that the person is engaged in criminal
activity.

Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979).

Article I Section 14 of the Constitution of the State of
Utah adopts language identical to that of the Fourth Amendment to
the Federal Constitution.

Utah has codified the Terry requirement

that detention of a person by the police for investigative purposes
must be based on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.

Section

77-7-15 Utah Code Ann. (1953) as amended states:
A police officer may stop any person in a public
place when he has a reasonable suspicion to
believe he has committed or is in the act of
committing or is attempting to commit a public
offense and may demand his name, address, and an
explanation of his actions (emphasis added).
See also State v. Swanigan, 699 p.2d 718 (Utah 1985).
In the present case, Mr. Sery contends that Sergeant
Pearson's detention of him and his luggage outside the Salt Lake
Airport constituted an unlawful seizure under the Fourth Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States and Article I Section 14 of
the Constitution of the State of Utah.
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In United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983), the United
States Supreme Court stated that the taking of a person's luggage
without his consent and submitting it to a drug detection dog
constitutes a "seizure" for the purpose of the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 707.

In Place, the Court stated that a police officer may

briefly detain a person's luggage and submit it to a drug detection
dog only if the officer has a reasonable suspicion that the
traveler's luggage contains narcotics.

Id. at 706.

Taking the

suitcase from Mr. Sery and submitting it to a drug detection dog was
a "seizure" under the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Article I, Section XIV of the Utah Constitution.
Mr. Sery's person, as well as his luggage, was seized in
this case.

In Terry v. Ohio, supra, the United States Supreme Court

acknowledged that a brief detention for the purpose of questioning a
person constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.

Terry and

its progeny establish that for the purpose of the Fourth Amendment a
person is "seized" when an officer "accosts an individual and
restrains his freedom to walk away."

This may be accomplished by

means of physical force or show of authority.

Terry, 392 U.S. at

16, 19. A person's freedom to walk away must be judged objectively;
a person has been seized if "in view of all of the circumstances
surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed
that he was not free to leave."

United States v. Mendenhall, 446

U.S. 544-545 (1980).
In the case at hand, Sergeant Pearson and other officers
approached Mr. Sery a second time while the latter was outside the
airport waiting for transportation.
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They had previously approached

Mr. Sery and identified themselves as officers, then followed him
through the airport (T. 8, 10-15).

The officers requested

permission to submit Appellant's suitcase to a sniff by a drug
detection dog (T. 17). When Mr. Sery refused permission, Sergeant
Pearson told Mr. Sery that he and his bag were being detained in
order to present the bag to the drug dog (T. 17). Sergeant Pearson
and the other officers then took Mr. Sery and his bag back into the
airport, seated Mr. Sery in a public area, and removed the bag from
Mr. Sery's presence to submit it to the dog (T. 17, 18).
In Mendenhall, the Supreme Court listed examples of
circumstances which might indicate a seizure.
were:

1)

Included in the list

the threatening presence of several officers and, 2) the

use of language indicating that compliance with the officer's
request might be compelled.

Id. at 554. Sergeant Pearson's

assertion of authority as a police officer in the presence of Agent
Whitaker and other officers, his express statement that Sery was
being detained and his confiscation of Mr. Sery's bag, coupled with
Mr.Sery's reasonable belief that he was not free to leave,
constituted a seizure of his person and of his property within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
In order for this seizure to be lawful, the officers
effectuating the detention must be able to point to specific
objective facts which caused them to believe Mr. Sery was involved
in criminal activity.

Terry v. Ohio, supra; United States v. Place,

supra; Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438 (1980).
In Reid v. Georgia, supra, the United States Supreme Court
held that Drug Enforcement Agents who observed behavior similar to
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that exhibited by Mr. Sery could not have reasonably suspected Reid
of criminal activity.

Drug Enforcement Agents in Reid observed the

petitioner and another man, both of whom carried shoulder bags,
depart from an early morning flight from Florida.

The agents saw

the petitioner occasionally look backward in the direction of the
other man as they proceeded along the concourse. When they reached
the main lobby of the terminal, the second man caught up with the
petitioner and spoke with him.
together.

They then left the building

The Agent approached the two men outside the building,

identified himself, and asked to see their airline ticket stubs and
identification.

Their tickets showed that they had stayed in

Florida only one day.

According to the agent, the men appeared

nervous during the encounter.
terminal.

Both men were asked to return to the

They did so and consented to a search.

cocaine in Reid's bag.

Officers found

The factors on which the agents based their

belief that Reid might be carrying narcotics included:

1)

he had

arrived from Fort Lauderdale (which the officers claimed was a
principal place of origin of cocaine in the country); 2) he arrived
early in the morning; 3) the agent thought that Reid and his
companion were attempting to conceal the fact that they were
traveling together; and, 4) the two apparently had no luggage other
than their carry-on bags.
The Court concluded that the detention of Reid was
impermissible because the agent, on the basis of the observed
behavior of the petitioner, could not, as a matter of law, have
reasonably suspected Reid of criminal activity.

The Court stated:

Of the evidence relied on, only the fact that the
petitioner preceded another person and
-9 -

occasionally looked backward at him as they
proceeded through the concourse relates to their
particular conduct. The other circumstances
describe a very large category of presumably
innocent travelers, who would be subject to
virtually random seizures, were the Court to
conclude that as little foundation as there was
in this case could justify a seizure. Nor can we
agree, on this record, that the manner in which
the petitioner and his companion walked through
the airport reasonably could have led the agent
to suspect them of wrongdoing. (Emphasis
added.) Id. at 441.
The behavior exhibited by Mr. Sery, and relied upon by
Sergeant Pearson and Agent Whitaker to justify Mr. Sery's detention
is indistinguishable from the type of behavior found by the United
States Supreme Court to be insufficient to warrant a detention in
Reid.

Sergeant Pearson was at the Salt Lake Airport, conducting a

training session for more than twenty officers in techniques for
detecting persons transporting drugs (T. 5, 50). Sergeant Pearson
and several of the officers monitored Mr. Sery's flight from Florida
because, according to the Sergeant, Florida is a source of cocaine
and marijuana (T. 23).
Sergeant Pearson testified that he usually had a success
rate of ninety percent using his airport training techniques.
However, while teaching local officers, Sergeant Pearson had a
success rate of only fifty percent (T. 41). Sergeant Pearson was
searching for subjects to use as part of his training; a large
potential to approach, question and investigate innocent persons on
less than a reasonable suspicion and to otherwise violate Fourth
Amendment and Article I, Section 14 rights exists under such a
situation.
Sergeant Pearson observed Mr. Sery looked around as he got
off the plane, and told the others "Let's follow himn (T. 25).
-10-

Based on his arrival from Florida and his looking around upon entry
into the terminal, Mr. Sery became the focus of several officers1
attention.

While the record as to how many men followed and

apprehended Mr. Sery is slightly confusing, it appears that at leas
three, and more probably six, men followed Mr. Sery from the gate
(T. 45, 50, 51).
After leaving the gate, Mr. Sery went to a coffee shop and
bought a cold drink.
around.

Before entering the coffee shop, he looked

This behavior is not inconsistent with that of an arriving

passenger who expects someone to meet him (T. 6, 51).
Mr. Sery exited the coffee shop and walked directly to a
bank of pay phones.

He was at the phones three to five minutes (T.

7, 45). Sergeant Pearson focused on Mr. Sery's behavior in looking
over the partition two times during that three to five minutes as
being suspicious behavior.

Such behavior is not unusual for an

individual expecting a person to pick him up.

In addition, where

six men have been following an individual for several minutes and
stand five feet away watching that person, glancing at the group
twice during a phone call of several minutes is not unusual or
suspicious behavior.
Sergeant Pearson stated that Mr. Sery exited the phone are
in an unusual manner.

However, choosing to exit the phone booth so

as not to have to walk next to several men who are staring at him i
not unusual behavior for an individual, regardless of his guilt or
innocence.
The officers approached Mr. Sery as he left the phone
area.

At this point, the officers did not have a reasonable

-11-

suspicion, based on specific articulable facts, that Mr. Sery was
carrying narcotics.

In fact, Sergeant Pearson testified that Mr.

Sery's behavior was not inconsistent with that expected of an
incoming passenger at the airport (T. 31). The officers spoke
briefly with Mr. Sery, then let him proceed.
During this initial stop, the officers asked to see Mr.
Sery's ticket.

He showed them his ticket, bearing the name of Sid

Sellow and told them the airlines had not heard his name correctly
and had made an error issuing the ticket (T. 9). The officers also
asked Mr. Sery if he would consent to a search of his luggage.
Sergeant Pearson testified that Sery's refusal of such consent was
one of the factors giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that he was
involved in criminal activity.

Citizens in this country have a

right to refuse to let officers search their possessions or homes.
While refusing consent may make officers think that their hunch or
intuition is correct, it is not an articulable fact upon which a
reasonable suspicion can be based.
The officers did not ask Mr. Sery his true name and did not
know his correct name until after the second stop, when they placed
him under arrest.

Because the officers did not know Mr. Sery's true

name, they had no information on which to determine the similarity
between the name on the ticket and Sery's correct name or on which
to determine whether Mr. Sery's explanation that the airline had not
heard his name correctly was reasonable.

Without ascertaining Mr.

Sery's true name, the incorrect name on the ticket coupled with Mr.
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Sery's explanation does not amount to an articulable fact giving
rise to a suspicion that Mr.Sery was involved in criminal activity.
After the initial stop, Sergeant Pearson checked the phone
number Mr. Sery had given Delta Airlines and discovered that it was
unpublished (T. 9). Sergeant Pearson did not check out when Mr.
Sery purchased the ticket or when he gave the number to the
airlines.

The Sergeant offered no testimony as to why an

unpublished number would make him suspicious.
our society have unpublished numbers.

Many individuals in

To say that giving an

unpublished number to an airlines when traveling gives rise to a
reasonable suspicion that the person was transporting drugs would
give the government license to stop numerous innocent individuals.
Neither Sergeant Pearson nor any of the other officers
related Mr. Sery's behavior or appearance to a drug courier profile
(T. 25). While Sergeant Pearson did explain that he considered
Florida a source of cocaine and marijuana, he did not explain why an
unlisted phone number, incorrect name or staring at officers would
give rise to a suspicion.

Officers in this case were involved in a

training seminar where they needed subjects to interview.

They had

a hunch Mr. Sery might be carrying drugs and followed up on it. The
information in their possession did not amount to a reasonable
suspicion based on articulable facts.

Because the seizure of the

luggage and Mr. Sery was in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and Article I, Section XIV of the Utah
Constitution, all evidence that flowed from that seizure must be
suppressed. (Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
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POINT I L

THE OFFICERS DID NOT HAVE PROBABLE CAUSE
TO ARREST THE APPELLANT,

The general rule under the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and Article I

Section XIV of the Utah

Constitution is that officers must have probable cause to believe
the individual committed a crime in order to seize that person.

See

Terry v. Ohio, supra; Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499 (1983).
As previously outlined, in Terry v. Ohio, supra, the United States
Supreme Court carved a limited exception to that rule, allowing
officers to briefly detain individuals for investigatory purposes
where such officers have a reasonable suspicion that criminal
activity is afoot.

However, where the detention of an individual

exceeds the limits of a Terry investigatory stop, officers must
still have probable cause in order to justify the detention.
Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979); Florida v. Royer, supra;
United States v. Place, supra.
In Florida v. Royer, supra, officers who observed the
defendant nervously pay cash for his airline ticket and believed
that his charactistics fit a "drug courier profile" approached the
defendant.

Upon request, but without verbal consent, the defendant

produced his airline ticket and driver's license which bore
different names.

The detectives informed the defendant that they

were narcotics agents and that they suspected him of transporting
narcotics.

Without returning his airline ticket or driver's license

the agents asked the defendant to accompany them to a small room
about forty feet away.

One of the agents retrieved defendant's

luggage from the airline, without the consent of the defendant, and
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brought it to the room.

When asked permission to search his

luggage, the defendant did not verbally consent but unlocked one of
his suitcases in which the officers found marijuana.

The agents

then told the defendant he was under arrest.
The United States Supreme Court concluded that when the
detectives identified themselves as narcotic agents, told the
defendant they suspected him of transporting narcotics, took away
his airline ticket and driver's license and asked him to accompany
them to the police room without telling him he was free to leave,
the defendant was seized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. The
Court found that the agent's detention of the defendant constituted
a more serious intrusion on his personal liberty than is allowable
on mere suspicion of criminal activity, that his detention amounted
to an arrest, and that the agents lacked the requisite cause to
arrest.

The factors relied on by the agents to detain the

defendant, his nervousness, the fact that he paid cash for his
ticket, and the fact that he used an assumed name were insufficient
to provide the officers with probable cause to arrest.

Since no

probable cause to arrest existed at the time the defendant consented
to a search of his luggage, his consent was tainted by the illegal
arrest and evidence discovered from that search was suppressed.
In United States v. Place, supra, the United States Supreme
Court held that the detention of the defendant's luggage exceeded
the permissible scope of a Terry stop.

In that case, Drug

Enforcement Agents seized the defendant's bags after he refused to
consent to a sniff test based on the defendant's behavior while
standing in line, different addresses on the luggage tags, and the

-15-

statement by defendant that he knew they were police officers. The
agents told Mr. Place he was free to go, but failed to inform him as
to how long he would be dispossessed of his luggage, where his
luggage would be or what arrangements could be made for the return
of the luggage.

The agents held the bags for ninety minutes, during

which they submitted them to a drug detection dog for a sniff test.
The dog responded positively and agents subsequently found cocaine
in the bags.
The Place court noted that the seizure of possessions can
be tantamount to the seizure of a person, infringing on a liberty as
well as possessory interest, where the individual is not informed of
when or where his luggage will be returned.

United States v. Place,

supra at 121-122.
Particularly in the case of detention of luggage
within the traveler's immediate possession, the
police conduct intrudes on both the suspect's
possessory interest in his luggage as well as his
liberty interest in proceeding with his
itinerary. The person whose luggage is detained
is technically still free to continue his travels
or carry out other personal activities pending
release of the luggage. Moreover, he is not
subjected to the coercive atmosphere of a
custodial confinement or to the public indignity
of being personally detained. Nevertheless, such
a seizure can effectively restrain the person
since he is subjected to the possible disruption
of his travel plans in order to remain with his
luggage or to arrange for its return. (Emphasis
added). 16^ at 121-122.
In the present case, the officers' detention of Mr. Sery
and his bag exceeded the permissible scope of a Terry stop.

The

officers initially approached Mr. Sery and identified themselves.
They then asked to search Mr. Sery's bag.

When he declined, they

told him he was free to leave (T. 8-9). However, they continued to
follow him.
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Sergeant Pearson and at least one other officer/ Agent
Whitaker, later approached Mr. Sery as he was sitting outside the
airport (T. 16). They asked Mr. Sery if he would submit his bag to
a drug detection dog.

When Mr. Sery declined consent, Sergeant

Pearson informed him that both he and the bag were being detained
and forced him to return to inside the terminal (T. 17). This
detention was similar to that in Royer—Officers identifying
themselves force the defendant to move to another location in order
to further inspect his luggage. While Sery was not taken to a room
as the defendant in Royer was, he was nevertheless confined in the
terminal and subjected to the "public indignity of being personally
detained."

See United States v. Place, supra at 121-2.

The confinement or detention in this case exceeded that in
Place since the defendant, not just his luggage, was directly
detained.

The defendant was not told how long he or his bag would

be detained nor when or if he would be released or get his luggage
back (T. 17-18).

He was forced to move inside by at least three

officers and subjected to the "coercive atmosphere of custodial
confinement."

Because the confinement of Mr. Sery exceeded the

limits of a Terry investigative stop, the officers should have had
probable cause to detain him in this manner.
In Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949) the
Supreme Court established that probable cause means more than a bare
suspicion.

Probable cause exists where facts and circumstances

within the officer's knowledge are sufficient to lead a reasonably
prudent person to believe that an offense has been or is being
committed.
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In the present case, the officers did not have probable
cause to believe Mr. Sery had committed a crime.

Sergeant Pearson

detained the Appellant because he looked nervous when he got off the
plane, looked over at Sgt. Pearson and the officers accompanying him
while making a phone call, exited the phone booth in an unusual
manner, refused to consent to a search of his suitcase, and provided
the airlines with a call-back phone number which was unpublished (T.
21, 37-38).

The sergeant had not found any drugs nor had any

specific indication that Sery possessed drugs when he detained Mr.
Sery and based his decision to seize Mr. Sery only on a hunch that
there were drugs in his bags.

The Royer Court stated that "not

every nervous young man paying cash for a ticket to New York City
under an assumed name and carrying two heavy American Tourister bags
may be arrested and held to answer for a serious felony charge."
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. at 243. The behavior relied on by the
officers to detain Mr. Sery is characteristic of that exhibited by
typical passengers at an airport and is less suggestive of criminal
activity than the behavior which the Royer court found was
insufficient to justify an arrest.
Since Mr. Sery was illegally detained when his luggage was
submitted to the narcotic detection dog, the evidence obtained as a
result of that search is tainted by the illegal detection and must
be suppressed.
CONCLUSION
For any or all of the foregoing reasons, the Appellant,
Mark Sery, requests that this Court suppress the evidence seized
from his luggage, and reverse his conviction for possession of
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controlled substance and remand this case to the trial court with an
order for either dismissal of the charges or a new trial.
Respectfully submitted this

(d

day of May, 1987.
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ADDENDUM A

Utah Code Ann. 58-37-8(2)(a)(i)(1985 supp):
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful:
(i)
for any person knowingly and intentionally
to possess or use a controlled substance,
unless it was obtained under a valid
prescription or order or directly from a
practitioner while acting in the course of
his professional practice, or except as
otherwise authorized by this subsection;

